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A fixed exchange rate regime eliminates one degree of freedom in absorbing macroeconomic 
shocks. Therefore, there is a call for higher labor market flexibility in countries which are 
members of the monetary union or those which intend to join the monetary union. Focusing 
on the cross-country analysis of labor markets in the enlarged European Union over 1995-
2004, this paper aims to assess empirically the role of aggregate wages as a correction 
mechanism for dealing with economic disturbances. We apply classical time series/panel, 
Bayesian, and cointegration techniques to determine the extent to which aggregate wages can 
accommodate shocks in the economy. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
A fixed exchange rate regime eliminates one degree of freedom in absorbing macroeconomic 
shocks. Therefore, there is a call for higher labor market flexibility in countries which are 
members of the monetary union or those which intend to join the monetary union. Focusing on the 
cross-country analysis of labor markets in the enlarged European Union, this paper aims to assess 
empirically whether steps towards the European Monetary Union (EMU) indeed go hand in hand 
with higher wage flexibility in reality.  
Due to limited and even declining mobility of workers within the new member states, and given 
the formal restrictions on the free movement of labor for new EU members, it is unlikely that 
migration can be considered an efficient tool for coping with adverse shocks. This paper, 
therefore, focuses on aggregate wage adjustment. A comparable quarterly data-set is constructed 
covering 1995–2004 for four central European states (CE-4), four new EU members already 
participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism-II (ERM-II participants), and three peripheral 
members of the euro area (EMU-3).  
We apply alternative econometric techniques to determine the extent to which aggregate wages 
can accommodate shocks in the economy. The macroeconomic data does not seem to support the 
argument that the degree of wage adjustment is significantly higher for countries which already 
participate in the ERM-II. Nor is wage flexibility higher in the three EMU members selected. In 
addition, a complementary comparison of wage flexibility across countries is done based on 
institutional characteristics of labor markets. The pattern of rigidities at the micro level does not 
differ much from the estimated macroeconomic indicators of wage flexibility.  
Several policy implications follow from the analysis. First, a lack of wage flexibility is considered 
to be one of the costs of euro adoption. However, the costs should be assessed against the 
potential benefits of joining the euro area. Second, joining the euro area is not likely to lead 
automatically to higher wage flexibility. Therefore, there is a call for adopting more flexible labor 
market policies in the monetary union in order to be better able to address asymmetric shocks. 
Third, the observed decrease in real wage flexibility in several countries, or the absence of such, 
could be at least partially linked to a decline in inflation in the new member states over the past 
decade. Last but not least, if the central bank sets its inflation target at too low a level, there might 
not be enough room for real wage adjustments. 
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1. Introduction 
After the enlargement of the European Union (EU) in May 2004, joining the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) is the next challenging step on the agenda of the ten new member states (NMS). Six 
of them – Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia – are already participating in 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II and have ambitions to adopt the euro by 2007. The 
remaining four new EU members – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
(henceforth the CE-4) – plan to be ready to join the euro area by 2010–2014.  
Various studies suggest that there is a need for higher labor market flexibility in the context of the 
EMU (e.g. Hallett, 2000, Obstfeld, 1997, Pissarides, 1997), of a currency board arrangement (e.g. 
Gulde et al., 2000), or of a less rigid exchange rate peg such as the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (e.g. Kopits, 1999). Indeed, it is commonly argued that a fixed exchange rate regime 
eliminates one degree of freedom in absorbing macroeconomic shocks. Since independent 
exchange rate policy is no longer available under fixed exchange rate arrangements, adjustment 
through the labor market should be of higher magnitude in countries with fixed exchange rates 
than with flexible ones. Membership in the monetary union imposes further requirements on 
factor market flexibility, since neither the exchange rate nor monetary policies can be used to deal 
with country-specific shocks. Therefore, there is a call for higher labor market flexibility in 
countries which are members of the monetary union or those which intend to join the monetary 
union. 
This paper aims to verify econometrically whether steps towards the EMU indeed go hand in hand 
with higher wage flexibility in reality. This is done in two main dimensions: across countries and 
over time. First, we compare the adjustment of aggregate wages (nominal, real) across three 
groups of countries: four central European member states (CE-4), four member states already 
participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism-II (ERM-II participants), and three peripheral 
members of the euro area (EMU-3). The representatives of the latter group – Austria, Greece, and 
Portugal – serve as a benchmark for judging the degree of wage flexibility in the new member 
states. Second, we analyze whether wage adjustment in the new member states changes over time. 
A comparable quarterly data-set of wages, prices, unemployment rates, and productivity is 
constructed for 1995–2004. 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 outlines the concept of labor 
market flexibility and provides further motivation for our focus on wage flexibility. Section 3 
proposes the research methodology and formulates the research hypothesis. Section 4 describes 
our data-set and gives the stylized evolution of unemployment, wages, prices, and productivity in 
eight selected new member states and three EMU members. The estimation results are presented 
in Section 5. These macro-economic outcomes are compared with micro-based measures of labor 
market flexibility. Section 6 discusses policy implications and concludes.  
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2. The Concept of Flexibility 
The notion of labor market flexibility is of course a very broad one. In principle, the labor market 
can accommodate shocks via two main channels: either quantities (adjustment in workers and in 
working time), or prices (wages), or a combination of both. Due to limited and even declining 
mobility of workers within the new member states, and given the formal restrictions on the free 
movement of labor for new EU members, it is unlikely that migration can be considered an 
efficient tool for coping with adverse shocks
1. Hence, more interest is focused on wage flexibility.  
Hyclak and Johnes (1992), Boeri et al. (1998), and Blanchflower (2001) argue that wage 
flexibility is a key determinant of labor market flexibility. Besides, adjustment in prices might 
seem quicker and less costly than adjustment in quantities. The European Commission (2003, p. 
155) stresses the importance of wage flexibility in the following paragraph: 
“Obviously, wages as the price of labour have a key role to play in determining the 
overall balance of supply and demand on the labour market. Furthermore, the 
formation of economic and monetary union (EMU) is often taken to put further 
demands on the flexibility of wages to compensate for the lack of (national) 
instruments to deal with economic disturbances. If wages are too rigid, the necessary 
adjustment will come slowly and with considerable economic and social costs.” 
Wage flexibility can be expressed in nominal or real terms. Nominal wage flexibility is the 
responsiveness of nominal wages to changes in the price level or inflation. Real wage flexibility 
can, in turn, be defined as the responsiveness of real wages to various shocks (e.g. shocks in 
productivity, unemployment, past wages, etc.). Wage flexibility characterizes different aspects if 
measured using aggregate or micro data. Due to a lack of available data across countries, this 
paper does not attempt to perform econometric estimates of wage flexibility at the micro level. 
Nevertheless, micro-foundations can be introduced by looking at institutional characteristics of 
labor markets.  
This paper, therefore, focuses on aggregate labor market adjustments, and the analysis is 
conducted in a cross-country comparative framework. From the macroeconomic point of view, 
“aggregate real wage flexibility determines the overall balance of supply and demand in the labor 
market and is a key substitute for the adjustment roles of the nominal exchange rate and an 
independent monetary policy.” (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 2) Since the difference between real and 
nominal wage growth is given by inflation, real and nominal wage adjustment approach each 
other in a low inflation environment. 
In spite of the common argument that a fixed exchange rate regime requires higher wage 
flexibility, theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence are both lacking. The same goes for 
studies focusing on the labor market in transition/accession countries (e.g. Schiff et al., 2001). 
This is the primary novel aspect of this project. Other novel aspects lie in constructing a 
comparable quarterly data-set for the new member states over the past decade, performing time-
                                                           
1 See Fidrmuc (2004) for recent evidence on labor migration in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia, in comparison with Italy, Spain, and Portugal. A detailed analysis of the Czech case is available in 
Flek (2004). The reasons for the restrictions on migration within the EU are discussed in Boeri and Brucker 
(2005). One explanation is that when the labor market is rigid, immigration may increase unemployment among 
the native population.  Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   5 
 
varying estimations of wage flexibility (using the Kalman filter methodology), and analyzing the 
effect of steps towards EMU membership on wage flexibility in a panel and cointegration 
framework. 
3. The Relationships Tested 
In this paper, the issue of wage flexibility is addressed using three alternative methods:   
(i) classical time series and panel estimates; (ii) the Bayesian approach; and (iii) cointegration and 
error correction. The main hypothesis is stated as follows: How different is wage 
flexibility/aggregate labor market adjustment in the following three groups of countries: (a) those 
with autonomous exchange rate policy (the CE-4); (b) the ERM-II participants (three of them 
having “hard pegs”); and (c) peripheral members of the euro area (the EMU-3)? 
Notice that the causality between the exchange rate regime and wage flexibility (labor market 
flexibility in general) can go in both directions. One way to address this issue is to base the 
empirical results on a solid theoretical framework, which implies one direction of causality. For 
example, wage-setting (WS) models could be used to study the impact of the exchange rate 
change on wage adjustment. Next, the direction of causality can be tested empirically (for 
example, in the sense of the Granger causality). Alternatively, there are methods (e.g. the third 
method in the above list) which do not impose any a priori assumptions on the direction of 
causality. Even if the precise assessment of causality is disputable, the estimation of aggregate 
wage/labor market adjustment may be still informative. For example, a lack of adjustment may 
motivate a need for deeper institutional reforms.  
Each of the three methods has its own pros and cons. The first two methods focus on short-run 
wage adjustment by estimating the basic Phillips curve specification. The second method 
explicitly addresses the issue of structural changes. Using the same variables as in the first 
method, the second method relaxes the assumption that the model’s coefficients are constant. This 
is achieved by applying the Kalman filtering technique. So, institutional changes are detected. 
Both methods, however, work with variables in differences (to render the series stationary). 
Hence, the long-run dynamics are neglected. Alternatively, the third method is designed to assess 
the long-term relationships between the variables in levels and also the short-run adjustment (the 
error correction term). There is a risk, however, of there being no long-term significant and stable 
relationship for some of the countries. In such a case, this suggests a potential problem on the 
labor market (long-lasting shocks, absence of equilibrium).  
(i) The classical estimation framework relies on the assumption that the regression parameters 
are unknown constants. Following Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), we estimate the basic Phillips 
curve specification and test the stability of the coefficient on unemployment under fixed versus 
floating exchange rate arrangements
2.  
                                                           
2 The wage-unemployment trade-off can also be modeled within the broader framework of the open economy, as 
described, for example, in Layard et al. (1991, p. 389). In such a model, which includes wage setting, price 
setting, trade balance, and output gap-unemployment equations, the nominal exchange rate affects wages and 
prices via import prices. In other words, price-setting behavior in the open economy depends on international 
competitiveness (Carlin and Soskice, 1990, p. 255, and Layard et al., 1991, p. 385). Our choice of the 
parsimonious Phillips curve (1) is driven by the data availability for Eastern European countries.  6   Ian Babetskii  
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where  ) ln( ) ln( 1 − − = ∆ t t t w w w ,  ) ln( ) ln( 2 1 1 − − − − = ∆ t t t p p p ,  t u  is the natural logarithm of the 
unemployment rate, and the last term  ) ln( ) ln( 1 − − = ∆ t t t q q q  is productivity growth. Coefficient 
2 c  represents the responsiveness of the rate of change of wage rates to the unemployment rate and 
thus characterizes wage flexibility. Negative and significant values of  2 c suggest that wages are 
flexible (growth in unemployment suppresses growth in wage costs). By contrast, positive or 
insignificant values of wage elasticity point to the absence of wage flexibility (a phenomenon 
known as hysteresis). Although nominal wages are present on the left-hand side, the coefficient 
2 c  measures, in fact, real wage flexibility, as price inflation is on the right-hand side as well. The 
remaining part of wage growth (e.g. due to growth in import prices, etc.) is captured by the 
constant term  1 c . The hypothesis that real wage flexibility is different under various degrees of 
exchange rate autonomy can be written as:  
ERM c c c 2 2 2 ′ ′ + ′ =   (2) 
 
where ERM  is a dummy taking one for ERM-II participants and zero otherwise. Substituting (2) 
into (1) gives 
t t t t t t t t q c p c u u ERM c u u c c w ε + ∆ + ∆ + − ′ ′ + − ′ + = ∆ − − − 4 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 ) ( ) (   (3) 
 
If wage flexibility is affected by the exchange rate regime, then the coefficient  2 c′ ′  should be 
statistically different from zero. In order to increase the power of the test, we estimate (3) for a 
panel of eight NMS. Selected EMU peripheral countries such as Austria, Greece, and Portugal 
serve as a benchmark. Notice that we do not include these countries in the panel estimations, in 
order to keep some homogeneity. Beside an unequal degree of economic development, the NMS 
and the EMU countries are characterized by different macroeconomic policies. In particular, an 
autonomous (at least formally) monetary policy is a common feature of the NMS, while four 
NMS are participants in the ERM-II and the other four are not. Thus, differences in wage 
adjustment on the macro level could be linked with diverse exchange rate policies
3. As alternative 
benchmarks, we compare wage adjustment with the selected developed countries, which are 
deprived of national autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policies (the EMU-3).  
 (ii) Under the Bayesian approach, the coefficients of regression are assumed to be random 
variables. The question is which other parameters in the basic Phillips curve equation (1), except 
the coefficient  2 c , should be time-varying. Intuitively, if the slope of the Phillips curve can 
change, the intercept should be allowed to be time-varying as well. 
t t t t t t t t q c p c u u c c w ε + ∆ + ∆ + − + = ∆ − − 4 1 3 1 2 1 ) (  (4) 
                                                           
3 Labor market policies and institutions such as unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, 
union coverage, the level of bargaining (sectoral versus nation-wide) etc. may affect the degree of wage 
flexibility as well. Due to the main focus of this paper on macroeconomic cross-country comparison, an 
assessment of these institutional effects, which typically requires microeconomic data, is beyond the scope of 
this study.  Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   7 
 
One popular econometric tool for the estimation of time-varying parameters is the Kalman filter. 
Note that the focus on short-run adjustment (thus ignoring long-run relationships), multiple 
causalities among the variables, and endogeneity bias (especially in the panel estimates) could be 
serious drawbacks of the above methods.  
(iii) The third method, the Johansen cointegration and vector error correction approach, 
explicitly accounts for non-stationarity of the series and incorporates both short-run and long-run 
dynamics
4. The method identifies whether there exists such a linear combination of non-stationary 
variables which turns out to be stable over time.  
t t u t q t w u c q c wr c c ε = + + + 0      (5) 
where wrt is the aggregate real wage (CPI-deflated), qt is average productivity, and ut is the 
unemployment rate. 
Moreover, the cointegration method reflects potential multiple causalities between the variables. 
The vector error correction mechanism allows joint determination of real wage, productivity and 










1 1 0 ) ) ' 1 ( ( αβ    (6) 
   
where  t Y  is the vector containing real wages, productivity and unemployment, t is the time trend, 
Φ , ,β α are matrices, and p= 3 is the number of variables; the lag structure of the model is 
determined using the information criteria and by an analysis of the residuals, which should be 
white noise. A link to the exchange rate policies can be established by comparing the process of 
short- and long-run wage adjustment for countries participating in the ERM-II versus those with a 
flexible exchange rate arrangement (the CE-4). Selected EMU members will be used as 
benchmarks. As for the drawbacks, the cointegration method is more demanding with respect to 
data length (ten years of quarterly data may not be sufficient for robust testing of long-term 
relationships). Also, the issue of the parameters’ stability may impose estimation problems. 
Our empirical strategy can be summarized as “from simple to more complex models”. In the first 
step, a country-by-country analysis is performed. Univariate time-series estimates could give an 
idea of the (dis)similarities of wage/labor market adjustment. A potential drawback is that the 
typical sample length (ten years of quarterly data) may not be sufficient to provide robust 
econometric testing. To achieve higher power, panel estimates are typically used. However, it is 
crucial to have some homogeneity in the panel. Otherwise, the interpretation of common slopes 
loses economic meaning. Hence, in the second step we focus on panel estimates, conditional on 
homogeneity tests. The robustness of the results is assessed by confronting the time-series and 
panel estimates. 
Finally, the measures of aggregate wage flexibility obtained are confronted with institutional 
micro-foundations of labor market flexibility, with the objective of assessing whether any 
common pattern emerges from the micro- and macro-based points of view.  
                                                           
4 See, for example, Enders and Dibooğlu (2001), Marcellino and Mizon (2000), and Tyrväinen (1995a,b) for 
applications of the cointegration method to the analysis of aggregate labor market adjustment.  8   Ian Babetskii  
 
4. Data 
Data issues in the new member states require extra attention, in particular if the objective is cross-
country comparison. Despite the apparent simplicity of the data needed, which are basic 
macroeconomic indicators, no single source provides either sufficient coverage or a sufficient 
length of quarterly time series. Therefore, a novel contribution of this paper is the construction of 
a data-set of quarterly macroeconomic indicators for the eight NMS, namely the Czech Republic 
(CZ), Estonia (ES), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LA), Lithuania (LI), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), and 
Slovenia (SL). To have a benchmark, we also collect data for Austria (AT), Greece (GR), and 
Portugal (PT). The following sources are used (in order of priority): 
- Eurostat New Cronos Database; 
- IMF International Financial Statistics; 
- OECD Statistical Compendium and Analytical Database; 
- National Statistics. 
 
Priority was given to Eurostat data, because they have the broadest coverage of the new member 
states. The data from the other sources were checked for consistency and selected so as to provide 
maximum compatibility with Eurostat. There is a question as to which form of data, original or 
deseasonalized, should be used in the estimations. We opted for seasonally adjusted data, since 
some of the series were available only in deseasonalized form
5. At the final stage of the 
construction of our data-set we removed, where necessary, the seasonal component by applying 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s X12 procedure, a method commonly used for seasonal adjustment
6. 
In short, our data-set contains nominal wages (average monthly earnings, economy wide), 
consumer prices (CPI), gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices, overall employment, and 
the standardized unemployment rate (OECD measure, comparable to the labor force survey 
concept). Figure 1 illustrates the development of unemployment rates in the NMS-8 and the 
EMU-3 over the past decade. Period-averages are reported in Table 1. One can observe high 
variation in unemployment rates across countries as well as over time. Wage and price inflation 
are reported in Figure 2 and Table 2. The two variables tend to follow similar trends. Overall, 
there is an apparent moderation in price and wage growth rates in the NMS, with gradual 
convergence towards the EMU-3 levels being observed
7. The development of real wages (CPI-
deflated) and average productivity (the ratio of real GDP to overall employment) is shown in 
Figure 3. A situation where real wages grow faster than productivity suggests potential problems 
on the labor markets (e.g. rising unemployment).  
 
                                                           
5 Seasonally unadjusted data are available for the Czech Republic and Poland. The use of seasonal dummies in 
univariate static and time-varying estimates gives qualitatively similar results as in the case of seasonally 
adjusted series. We also experimented with four lag differences, but in this case price inflation and wage 
inflation become non-stationary and we cannot make an inference from the resulting estimates.  
In the vector error correction specification – a method which is designed to deal with non-stationary series – the 
application of seasonally unadjusted data does not affect the long-term relationships; however, the impulse 
responses are more clear-cut. Overall, seasonal adjustment tends to smooth the short-term dynamics.  
6 X12 is a sort of moving-average filtering procedure with time-evolving seasonal factors. 
7 Notice the temporary shock to wages in Greece in the aftermath of euro adoption.  Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   9 
 
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates (% of labor force), 1995–2004, quarterly 
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Table 1: Unemployment Rates (% of labor force), 1995–2004 averages 
 
CE-4 ERM-II EMU 
CZ 6.8 ES 10.0  AT 6.7 
HU 7.3 LA 8.2 GR  10.3 
PO  15.0 LI 8.7 PT 5.6 
SK 15.7 SL 12.6     
Mean  11.2  Mean 9.8 Mean 7.6 
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Figure 2: Price Inflation and Wage Inflation, yearly changes, 1995–2004, quarterly* 






































































































Table 2: Price Inflation and Wage Inflation, yearly changes, 1995–2004, quarterly* 
CE-4 ERM-II  EMU-3 
  G_CPI G_WN    G_CPI G_WN    G_CPI G_WN 
CZ  5.3 10.2 ES  9.2 15.8 AT  1.7  1.9 
HU 13.0  14.9  LA  7.4  10.5  GR  4.2  6.9 
PL  10.4  14.1 LI 8.2 9.1 PT 3.0 1.6 
SK  7.8 9.7 SL 8.0  11.0       
Note: 
*Price inflation G_CPIt = (CPIt/CPIt–4 – 1); wage inflation G_WNt = (WNt/WNt–4 – 1). Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   11 
 
Figure 3: Real Wages and Productivity, 1995–2004, quarterly 
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Note: Real wages WR = WN/CPI; productivity PROD = GDP/Employment. 
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To assess the stationarity properties of the data, we apply standard techniques: the augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP), and Kwiatowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) unit 
root tests
8. Overall, the series of price inflation, wage inflation, unemployment, real wages and 
productivity in the NMS-8 and EMU-3 can be characterized as integrated of order one.  
Concerning the exchange rate arrangements, we construct a dummy variable for ERM-II 
membership. One reason for introducing this dummy is to characterize fixed exchange rate 
regimes: three of the four countries from our sample which participate in the ERM-II (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania) have more than a decade of “hard peg” history. Another meaning of the 
ERM-II dummy is a proxy for readiness for euro adoption. Although Slovenia has formally 
followed a policy of managed floating since 1992, its participation in the ERM-II together with 
the three Baltic States indicates a serious intention to join the EMU (after the mandatory two years 
in the mechanism) and, hence, abandon its autonomous exchange rate and monetary policies.  
On the other hand, the countries of the CE-4 group, apart from having postponed euro adoption 
for at least several years, are also characterized by more flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the exchange rate development in three of these countries can 
be characterized as a move “from fixed to floating”: the Czech Republic abandoned its fixed peg 
in 1997, Slovakia did so in 1998, and Poland switched from a crawling peg to free floating in 
2000. Finally, Hungary maintained a crawling band till 2001 (then adopted a fixed band with 
±15% fluctuation margins). 
Based on exchange rate considerations, we intend to test whether there are significant differences 
in labor market/wage adjustment across these two groups of countries as well as within these 
groups. We will also verify whether wages are more responsive to shocks in countries deprived of 
exchange rate and monetary autonomy (the EMU-3 group) 
5. Results 
5.1 Time Series/Panel Methods 
Table 3 presents time series estimates of the Phillips curve (1) for the CE-4, ERM-II participants, 
and the EMU-3 countries. The elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment (the coefficient 
C2) may take positive or negative values. Negative values suggest wage flexibility, i.e., an 
increase in unemployment depresses wage growth. On the other hand, positive or insignificant 
values of wage elasticity indicate an absence of wage flexibility (a phenomenon known in the 
literature as hysteresis. Estimations are performed on two equal sub-periods, 1995–1999 and 
2000–2004. The results suggest that several countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, 
and Greece) experienced a decrease in wage flexibility (the elasticity changed from negative 
values for 1995–1999 to insignificant numbers for 2000–2004). Interestingly, for the last period 
wage flexibility is insignificant in all the countries listed.  
 
 
                                                           
8 For a popular description of the identification strategy, see, for example, Enders (2004). Due to space 
limitations, the results of the unit root tests are not reported here, but are available upon request. Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   13 
 
A finding of limited aggregate wage flexibility in the new member states is not new in the 
literature. For example, Radziwiłł and Walewski (2003) analyze labor market adjustment in six 
Eastern European countries, using quarterly data over 1995–2002. The episodes of real wage 
adjustment to unemployment are identified as being 1997–1998 for the Czech Republic, 1999 for 
Slovakia, and the pre-2000 period for Lithuania. No significant periods of real wage adjustment 
are reported for Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. This is also a pattern we can see from the estimates 
for the two sub-periods shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Elasticity of Wages to the Unemployment Rate, time-series estimates 
CE-4 ERM-II  EMU-3 
  95–99 00–04   95–99 00–04    95–99 00–04 
CZ -0.154***  -0.017  ES  0.001  -0.042  AT 0.002  -0.017 
HU 0.11  -0.43 LA 0.049  -0.038  GR -0.302*  -0.278 
PL -0.129  0.047  LI -0.113*  -0.004 PT -0.001  -0.015 
SK -0.117**  0.116  SL  -0.097  -0.053       
Note: OLS estimates of eq. (1) with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
Table 4a: Elasticity of Wages to the Unemployment Rate, panel estimates 
Dependent variable: growth rate of nominal wages 
Regressors: 
 
   95–99    00–04  
dU    -0.136 ***  0.015  
ERM*dU    0.067 *  -0.020  
gCPI(-1)   0.239  ***  0.031  
gPROD   0.116    -0.066  
Country Fixed Effects***       
_CZ--C   0.028   0.018  
_HU--C   0.026   0.028  
_PL--C   0.031   0.012  
_SK--C   0.021   0.020  
_ES--C   0.033   0.026  
_LA--C   0.022   0.019  
_LI--C   0.021   0.010  
_SL--C   0.021   0.021  
      
N  obs.   157   160  
Adj. R-
sq.   0.24   0.16  
F-stat   5.54  ***  3.75 *** 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.19    2.23  
Note: Fixed effects estimates of eq. (3) with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 4b: Test of Similarity of Wage Elasticity across Country Groups 
 
  1995–1999 2000–2004 
 Chi-square  Df  Probability  Chi-square  Df  Probability 
NMS-8 31.05  7  0.0001  7.42  7  0.3872 
CE-4 18.45  3  0.0004  3.16  3  0.3681 
ERM-II 9.72  3  0.0211  2.17  3  0.5389 
Note: Wald coefficient test, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates of eq. (1). The null 
hypothesis is that wage elasticity is the same for a given country group. No other restrictions are 
imposed.  
 
Next, the panel estimates (Table 4) performed for the group of eight new member states show 
similar pattern of a decrease in wage flexibility (the elasticity changed from -0.136 for 1994–1999 
to an insignificant 0.015 for 2000–2004). The effect of the ERM-II dummy has a positive sign, 
meaning that wage flexibility was higher in the CE-4 compared to the ERM-II group for 1994–
1999; no significant differences are found for the recent period. Another way to test the effect of 
the ERM-II group on wage elasticity is to assume that the coefficient on unemployment C2 is the 
same across the eight NMS, without imposing any restrictions on the other parameters. To do so, 
a system of eight country-specific equations (1) is jointly estimated. The results of the Wald test 
for wage elasticity C2 are reported in Table 4b. For 1994–1999, the hypothesis of common wage 
elasticity within the group of eight NMS, as well as within the CE-4 or ERM-II groups, is 
rejected. On the other hand, for 2000–2004 the wage elasticity is not statistically different across 
all the country-blocks. These results are in line with the time-series estimates. Indeed, during the 
late 1990s, the wage elasticity in the CE-4 was higher than in the ERM-II group; in the recent 
period, the wage elasticity turns out to be insignificant in all eight new member states. 
5.2 Kalman Filter Estimates  
Figure 4 illustrates the time-varying estimates of the slope of the Phillips curve. Wage flexibility 
is indeed not constant, and there are cases of both positive and negative reactions of wages to 
increases in unemployment. Positive values correspond to a sort of hysteresis, i.e., an absence of 
wage flexibility. The more negative is C2t, the more flexible are real wages. Downward-sloping 
patterns of wage flexibility are observed for the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland. However, in 
the Czech case, wage flexibility was increasing only till 1998, and one can observe a decline in 
flexibility from 1999 onwards. In Latvia, despite a declining trend, the wage elasticity is still 
positive at the end of 2004, meaning that growth in unemployment is accompanied by growth in 
wage costs. This indicates an absence of wage flexibility. Similarly in Poland, there are some 
signs of wage flexibility during 2001–2003, but overall the wage elasticity is not significantly 
different from zero. 
For some CE-4 countries, we can tentatively observe a very weak link between the fixing of the 
exchange rate and wage flexibility. For example, in the Czech Republic the exchange rate regime 
changed from a fix to a float in the middle of 1997. This corresponds to an observed decrease in 
real wage flexibility two years later. Similarly, the relaxation of the exchange rate peg in Slovakia 
in the second half of 1998 is followed by a decrease in real wage flexibility from 2000 onwards. Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   15 
 
For the rest of the sample the estimates of wage flexibility are not significantly different from 
zero
9.  
Figure 4: Time-Varying Estimates of Real Wage Flexibility, 1995–2004 
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Note: Kalman filter estimates of C2,t in eq. (4). Two standard error bands are plotted.  
Negative and significant values of C2,t mean wage flexibility.  
 
                                                           
9 Belke and Setzer (2004) find that exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on employment 
growth in Central and Eastern European countries, thus contributing to growth in unemployment. In what 
follows, euro adoption, by eliminating exchange rate risk, can be viewed as a sort of active labor market policy, a 
substitute for the removal of employment protection legislation.  16   Ian Babetskii  
 
The ERM-II participants do not demonstrate higher wage flexibility compared to the CE-4 group. 
The estimates are insignificant for most of the period. Similar results apply to the EMU-3. 
Overall, the time-varying estimates do not support the view that wage flexibility is higher in 
countries participating in the ERM-II or in the EMU members compared to the CE-4. Also, for the 
few cases where estimates are significant, there is evidence of a decrease rather than an 
improvement in flexibility in recent years.  
5.3 Cointegration/Error Correction 
First we determine the optimal lag length in the vector autoregressive representation (6). Using 
the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, the number of lags is mostly found to be one, and in 
a few cases two or three. To preserve homogeneity and parsimony, we set the number of lags to 
one for all countries
10. Next, we test for the presence of a long-run relationship between real 
wages, productivity, and the unemployment rate. According to the Johansen cointegration test, 
there is one stable vector (significant at the 10% level) in the case of Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Lithuania. No long-run relationships between the three variables are detected for the 
EMU-3 members. The absence of cointegration suggests that there is disequilibrium on the 
aggregate labor market, or that there are structural changes. The cases of cointegration are 
reported in Table 5.  
The cointegrating vectors are normalized so that the coefficient on real wages is equal to one. 
Inspection of the long-term relationships indicates that real wages closely follow productivity in 
Estonia. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, real wages grow faster than productivity, while in 
Lithuania productivity growth is stronger than that of real wages. Notice that the long-run 
coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities in the strict sense, since each of the coefficients 
incorporates the effect of shocks to all variables (see Lutkepohl, 1994). The long-run coefficient 
on unemployment does not have any particular meaning, since equation (6) is not a structural 
representation and unemployment may enter with either positive or negative sign depending on 
the cycle.  
Next, the error correction representation provides information about the adjustment channels. Two 
contrasting examples are the Czech and Estonian cases. In Estonia, adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium occurs via real wages and productivity. The unemployment channel is insignificant. 
On the other hand, the real wage and productivity channels do not play a significant role in the 
Czech case, and it is unemployment which closes the gap. In Hungary and Lithuania, real wages 
react to deviations from equilibrium, while the productivity and unemployment channels are 
insignificant. The speed of short-run wage adjustment, measured by the coefficient on the error 
correction term, is the highest in Lithuania (-0.394), followed by Estonia (-0.347) and Hungary  
(-0.271). Negative values mean a return towards equilibrium, i.e., the error correction mechanism 
is at work. Summarizing, there is an indication of a higher magnitude of short-run wage 
adjustment in Lithuania. However, real wages do not react to changes in unemployment in any of 
the four countries considered. 
 
                                                           
10 Estimations with two and three lags produce little difference in the long-run elasticities, but the error 
correction part becomes less clear-cut because of a substantial reduction in the number of freedoms. The results 
are available upon request. Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   17 
 




Cointegrating Eq. CointEq1 CointEq1
WR(-1) 1 1
PROD(-1) -1.576 *** -0.953 ***
-(0.104) -(0.024)
UR_STD(-1) -0.014 0.127 ***
-(0.024) -(0.031)
C 0.011 -0.249
Error Correction D(WR) D(PROD) D(UR) D(WR) D(PROD) D(UR)
CointEq1 -0.061 0.063 0.733 *** -0.347 *** 0.283 *** 0.049
-(0.116) -(0.079) -(0.240) -(0.129) -(0.097) -(0.338)
D(WR(-1)) 0.022 -0.002 -0.254 -0.032 -0.167 0.043
-(0.185) -(0.126) -(0.385) -(0.151) -(0.114) -(0.396)
D(PROD(-1)) 0.247 0.176 -0.508 -0.054 0.049 -0.622
-(0.290) -(0.197) -(0.602) -(0.181) -(0.137) -(0.476)
D(UR(-1)) -0.076 -0.031 0.542 *** 0.016 -0.087 0.667 ***
-(0.059) -(0.040) -(0.122) -(0.070) -(0.053) -(0.184)
C 0.010 *** 0.006 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.019 *** 0.006
-(0.003) -(0.002) -(0.006) -(0.004) -(0.003) -(0.011)
Sample: 1995:1 - 2004:4 1995:1 - 2004:4
Nobs: 40 40
 R-squared 0.186 0.039 0.750 0.248 0.201 0.367




Cointegrating Eq. CointEq1 CointEq1
WR(-1) 1 1
PROD(-1) -1.967 *** -0.618 ***
-(0.347) -(0.051)
UR_STD(-1) -0.254 0.005  
-(0.132) -(0.031)
C 0.674 0.102
Error Correction D(WR) D(PROD) D(UR) D(WR) D(PROD) D(UR)
CointEq1 -0.271 *** 0.057 0.122 -0.394 *** 0.092 0.405
-(0.089) -(0.049) -(0.192) -(0.102) -(0.107) -(0.324)
D(WR(-1)) 0.040 0.005 0.194 0.352 *** 0.221 0.223
-(0.140) -(0.077) -(0.302) -(0.128) -(0.135) -(0.408)
D(PROD(-1)) -0.407 0.220 -0.019 -0.229 -0.301 * 0.362
-(0.348) -(0.192) -(0.751) -(0.152) -(0.160) -(0.484)
D(UR(-1)) 0.008 0.018 0.191 0.029 -0.009 0.583 ***
-(0.083) -(0.046) -(0.180) -(0.047) -(0.050) -(0.151)
C 0.011 *** 0.006 *** -0.010 *** 0.008 ** 0.021 *** -0.011
-(0.004) -(0.002) -(0.009) -(0.004) -(0.004) -(0.013)
Sample: 1995:1 - 2004:4 1995:1 - 2004:4
Nobs: 40 40
 R-squared 0.228 0.056 0.053 0.479 0.182 0.530
 Adj. R-squared 0.134 -0.059 -0.062 0.416 0.083 0.473
 
Note: Estimates of eq. (5), respectively (6), linking real wages (WR), productivity (PROD), and 
unemployment (standardized rate of, UR_STD). 
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Bringing together the long-run and short-run outcomes, the following pattern emerges. In the 
Czech Republic, a stable linear relationship between productivity, real wages (which grow faster 
than productivity) and unemployment is possible basically due to rising unemployment. This is 
rather an example of an undesired equilibrium. In Estonia, unemployment turns out to be 
exogenous to the short-run adjustment, in the sense that deviations from long-run equilibrium are 
closed by real wages and productivity. Moreover, unemployment is insignificant in the wage and 
productivity equations, meaning that real wages and productivity move together, independently of 
the unemployment situation. One cannot characterize such a labor market as flexible either, since 
the variation in unemployment has no impact on real wages. The adjustment in Hungary and 
Lithuania resembles the case of Estonia, except that productivity is no longer significant (i.e., the 
short-run adjustment occurs via real wages, which, in turn, are not sensitive to unemployment).  
 5.4 Comparison with Micro-Foundations 
The three alternative methods considered so far commonly suggest that real wages are inflexible 
in the eight NMS. The same results apply to the three EMU members selected. While the time 
series and panel methods detect several cases of wage flexibility during 1995–1999 (e.g. for the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Greece), the elasticity of wages to unemployment 
becomes insignificant when considered for 2000–2004. Similarly, the time-varying estimates 
indicate a deterioration of wage flexibility over time rather than an improvement. Cointegration 
and error correction representations shed some light on the mechanism of labor market 
adjustment: in three of the four cases where a long-run equilibrium was detected, real wages do 
not react to changes in the unemployment rate; the adjustment to shocks goes rather via real 
wages and productivity, the unemployment channel being insignificant. To complement the 
macroeconomic analysis, let us look at the micro-based measures of wage flexibility.  
Galuscak and Munich (2005) estimate the wage curve in the Czech Republic over 1993–2001. 
The wage curve links real wages and unemployment at the regional level. The authors find 
substantial wage adjustment for the period 1994–1996, followed by a decrease in wage flexibility 
during the recession of 1997–1999. After 1999, wage flexibility did not return to the original 
level, most probably due to an increase in long-term unemployment. This is what we can observe 
from the time-series estimates of wage flexibility at the macro level: in the static Phillips curve 
(Table 3), wage elasticity is significant and correctly signed for 1995–1999, then it becomes 
insignificant for 2000–2004; according to the time-varying Phillips curve (Figure 4), wage 
elasticity increased up to 1998 and has declined since 1999. 
Blanchflower (2001) explores the behavior of wages in a larger set of Eastern European countries 
during 1991–1997. A wage curve is found in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, and Slovakia. The Slovenian data do not support a significant link between wages and 
unemployment. Wage data are unavailable for Lithuania. The magnitude of wage adjustment in 
Eastern Europe, at the regional level, is found to be broadly similar to the estimates for other 
countries (a wage elasticity of around -0.1); in Estonia and Latvia, the wage elasticity is much 
higher, at about -0.5. Notice that the estimates are performed for the mid-1990s. In the author’s 
opinion, “it is likely that the absolute size of these estimates will fall as more years of data 
become available and full sets of region fixed dummies are included. This is generally what 
happens in OECD countries.”  More recent evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Iara and 
Traistaru (2004) report wage elasticity for Poland in the range of -0.04 to -0.06 over 1992-1998. Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   19 
 
No significant wage adjustment was found for Hungary during 1992-1999. Covering a larger set 
of countries over the period 1993-2003, von Hagen and Traistaru-Siedschlag (2005) obtain 
regional wage elasticity of -0.15 for the Baltic countries, -0.06 for Slovakia, insignificant for the 
Czech Republic and Poland, and even positive for Hungary (0.15) and Slovenia (0.56) which 
indicates a sort of hysteresis (regions with higher unemployment are characterized by higher 
wages, the phenomenon known as “compensating differential”).  Summarizing, wage flexibility at 
the regional level in the eight East European NMS does not appear to be higher than in other 
developed nations.  
A complementary comparison of wage flexibility across countries could be done based on 
institutional characteristics of labor markets. Botero et al. (2004) construct aggregate indices of 
labor market rigidity (“regulation of labor”) across 85 industrialized and developing countries for 
the late 1990s. The underlying indicator of protection of employed workers is the closest proxy 
for micro-economic wage flexibility. Indeed, this indicator is based on assessing the cost of 
increasing hours worked and the cost of firing, and it takes into account dismissal procedures and 
alternative employment contract practices. These characteristics are determinants of the 
(downward) wage flexibility at the microeconomic level, since the more protected workers are, 
the less willing they are to accept wage decreases. 




















0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
United States
United Kingdom



















Source: Botero et al. (2004) 
Note: Higher indices mean higher labor market rigidity. 
Figure 5 illustrates indices of labor market rigidity. The data are available for all the countries of 
our sample except Estonia. Overall, the CE-4, the ERM-II participants and the EMU-3 have quite 
high rigidities of comparable magnitude (the corresponding averages are 0.55, 0.69, and 0.61), 20   Ian Babetskii  
 
which is above the sample mean across 85 countries (0.49) and much higher than, for example, in 
the case of the United Kingdom (0.28) or the United States (0.22). The rigidity in the CE-4 is 
slightly lower than in the three ERM-II participants. The pattern of rigidities at the micro level 
does not differ much from the estimated macroeconomic indicators of wage flexibility. A similar 
finding of no significant wage flexibility is reported in Radziwiłł and Walewski (2003). The 
authors analyze a broad set of indicators at the macro and micro levels and conclude that wages 
are not flexible in six new member states (accession countries at that time), except for some 
evidence of flexibility in Lithuania. 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper we have attempted to measure aggregate wage flexibility in eight new EU member 
states, applying classical time series/panel estimates and time-varying and cointegration 
techniques. The macroeconomic data over the past decade do not seem to support the argument 
that the degree of wage adjustment is significantly higher for countries which already participate 
in the ERM-II. Nor is wage flexibility higher in the three EMU members selected. Several policy 
implications follow from the analysis.  
First, the assessment of wage flexibility gives some indication of the costs related to entering the 
ERM-II and subsequently the euro area. Indeed, the degree of wage flexibility (nominal, real) 
shows the extent to which various shocks can be accommodated by wages. In the hypothetical 
example of perfectly flexible wages, abandoning independent exchange and interest rate policies 
would not be costly, since any external or internal shocks would be accommodated by wages. In 
the opposite extreme case of rigid wages (and assuming no labor mobility), other channels will 
bear the burden of shocks. For instance, an increase in unemployment is one possible outcome of 
wage rigidities. A lack of wage flexibility is considered to be one of the costs of euro adoption. 
However, the costs should be assessed against the potential benefits of joining the euro area. 
Second, there is a question of whether wage flexibility is endogenous to fixing the exchange rate. 
In other words, is high wage flexibility required prior to euro adoption in order to minimize the 
adverse impact of shocks, or will the mere fact of joining the euro area improve wage flexibility 
ex post? The results of our study suggest that higher wage flexibility is an attribute of neither the 
current ERM-II participants nor the three peripheral EMU members. Hence, joining the euro area 
is not likely to lead automatically to higher wage flexibility. Rather, the opposite effect could 
occur. Therefore, there is a call for adopting more flexible labor market policies in the monetary 
union in order to be better able to address asymmetric shocks.  
Third, in a low-inflation environment, real wage flexibility becomes almost synonymous with 
nominal wage flexibility, and both terms characterize the cost of disinflation. However, if nominal 
wages are rigid, especially downward, then the adjustment to shocks would go more quickly via 
real wages at higher inflation rates. Indeed, real wages can decrease due to a reduction in nominal 
wages or due to a rise in the price level. If nominal wages are sticky, then non-indexed price 
increases reduce the real cost of labor. Thus, the observed episodes of real wage flexibility during 
the 1990s could be at least partially linked to inflation, which reached two-digit numbers in a 
number of countries. Consequently, a decline in inflation in the new member states over the past 
decade may have naturally contributed to the observed decrease in real wage flexibility, or the 
absence of such.  Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States   21 
 
Last but not least, if the central bank sets its inflation target at too low a level, there might be not 
enough room for real wage adjustments. This point is reflected in ECB (2003), according to which 
the price stability criterion is interpreted as keeping the inflation rate close to two percent. This is 
different from the original interpretation of price stability as inflation between zero and two 
percent. When the ability of wages to adjust is limited, the productivity channel may be viewed as 
an alternative shock absorber. In particular, if productivity grows faster than real wages, this 
creates some margin for coping with shocks. 
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